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THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: WOULD ADOPTION OF
THE ALI PRINCIPLES IMPROVE CURRENT OUTCOMES?
MARSHA GARRISON*
I.  INTRODUCTION
A decade ago, I reviewed the economic consequences of divorce under
prevailing legal standards.  After describing the available evidence, I concluded
that:
The economic consequences of divorce today are the “equitable” division of
property worth too little to matter; no or short-term alimony; child support that
fails to ensure a standard of living for the children and their mother equivalent
to that of the father; outcomes that are inconsistent and often unpredictable, and
that, for women and children, do not appear to be getting better; and economic
hardship that often could have been lessened through more equitable rules.
Divorce law cannot cure the feminization of poverty or the problems of single
parent families, but it can ensure outcomes that impose the burden of divorce
fairly upon all family members. That is the goal for which divorce reform
should strive.1
Would adoption of the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution significantly alter the results of current law?  If so, would
those altered results ensure that “the burden of divorce [is imposed] fairly upon
all family members?”  This commentary addresses these important questions.
II.  CURRENT LAW AND ITS RESULTS
The need for divorce law reform flows from the structure and content of
current legal standards.  My earlier review noted two major reasons why those
standards have failed to achieve outcomes that fairly distribute the burden of
divorce.
First, in most states, the rules governing property distribution and alimony
are “vague, complex, and highly discretionary.”2  New York’s Domestic Rela-
tions Law, for example, requires courts to distribute marital property “equitably
between the parties,” after reviewing twelve separate, often conflicting, consid-
erations plus “any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
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proper.”3  Divorcing couples have great difficulty using standards like this one
to determine what decision a judge would make in their own case.  The outcome
that such a couple achieves thus is often unpredictable; like cases simply do not
produce like results.  While judicial decision making and lawyer assistance ap-
pear to improve the consistency of case outcomes,4 even full litigation—two-
party representation and trial before an experienced judge—often produces
highly disparate decisions.  Indeed, in my survey of judicial decision making in
New York, one decision—the length of a durational alimony award—was sig-
nificantly related to none of the factors enumerated in the alimony statute. The
permanence of alimony awards was somewhat more predictable, but one of the
case factors significantly related to outcome was the political party of the judicial
decision-maker!5  The vague, discretionary standards that characterize much of
current divorce law thus invite the substitution of personal for public values.
They are also “ill-suited to the volume of divorce cases filed and their generally
routine characteristics. . . [C]lear, simple, and universal rules [are needed]. . . .”6
A second problem with current divorce law lies in its failure to provide a
fairness metric that comports with familial expectations and public values.  Ar-
eas of divorce law that rely on a multiplicity of conflicting factors fail in this re-
gard because they provide, in essence, no metric at all.  But even child support
law, which now relies on numerical guidelines instead of discretionary stan-
dards, evidences this problem.
All state child support guidelines now in effect base the support obligation
on the marginal cost of maintaining the parental living standard when a new
child joins the family.7  This “continuity-of-expenditure” approach has no basis
in the discretionary standards which it replaced; those standards universally
specified that the support award should reflect the resources currently available
to both segments of the divided family, the child’s reasonable needs, and the
living standard the child would have enjoyed had the family not dissolved.8
Public opinion surveys suggest continued reliance on these factors in measuring
the fairness of child support, but the continuity-of-expenditure model largely
ignores them.9  The states have struggled to adapt the model to typical post-
dissolution scenarios such as joint custody or the birth of additional children to
3. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW. § 236 B(5)(c) (McKinney 1999).
4. See Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribu-
tion Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 710-11 (1991); Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges
Decide Divorce Cases?  An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 480-
94 (1996); see also Nancy Thoennes et al., The Impact of Child Support Guidelines on Award Adequacy,
Award Variability, and Case Processing Efficiency, 25 FAM. L.Q. 325, 340-41 tbl.10 (1991).
5. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 488 tbl.29, 489-90.
6. See Garrison, Economic Consequences, supra note 1, at 22.
7. As of 1999, all states but three employed continuity-of-expenditure guidelines; Delaware,
Hawaii, and Montana utilized guidelines based on the “Melson” formula, which aims at poverty
prevention as well as continuity-of-expenditure.  For a state-by-state comparison of guideline mod-
els, see Jane C. Venohr & Robert G. Williams, The Implementation and Periodic Review of State Child
Support Guidelines, 33 FAM. L.Q. 7, 11 tbl.1 (1999).
8. See, e.g.,  UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 309, 9A U.L.A. 400 (1987).
9. See Marsha Garrison, Autonomy or Community?  An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obli-
gation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 41, 98-102 (1998) (reviewing survey evidence on public attitudes towards
child support determination).
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the obligor. But because a past-focused methodology provides little guidance in
such cases, it is not surprising that state rules are inconsistent and controver-
sial.10  More importantly, parents and children typically measure the fairness of a
support award in relation to their current circumstances; if a support award
leaves the smaller segment of the divided family with the lion’s share of the in-
come, the other segment is likely to feel aggrieved.  In the typical case where the
custodial mother earns less than the support-obligor father, this is exactly the
result the continuity-of-expenditure model produces. Researchers have consis-
tently reported that in such cases the guidelines produce awards that improve
the living standard of the support obligor, while that of his child significantly
declines.11 But guidelines employing a continuity-of-expenditure methodology
invariably “penalize children for being in the custody of a parent who has less
income, and reward them for living with the parent who has more.”12  Thus, in
atypical families where the custodial parent earns as much or more than the
noncustodial parent, and in the extremely common case in which the noncusto-
dial parent marries a new spouse who does so, continuity-of-expenditure
guidelines comparatively disadvantage the noncustodial parent.  Current
guidelines thus produce cries of unfairness from advocates for both mothers and
fathers, and both groups can point to cases in which the charge seems justified.
The continuity-of-expenditure model has not even proven itself capable of
significantly increasing the level of awards, or decreasing their variability.  Con-
gress mandated guidelines expecting that they would achieve these aims.  But in
some states award levels did not increase at all after guidelines were introduced
and in others award levels increased only within one or another income group.13
Support awards also remain highly variable; indeed, in some jurisdictions, re-
searchers have reported that the majority of support awards deviate significantly
from those the guidelines suggest.14  Parental agreement is the most important
10. See Robert G. Williams, An Overview of Child Support Guidelines in the United States, in CHILD
SUPPORT GUIDELINES: THE NEXT GENERATION 1, 12-13 (Margaret Campbell Haynes ed., 1994) (de-
scribing state responses to “perplexing” and “emotion-laden” issues of joint custody and additional
dependents); Marygold S. Melli, Guideline Review: Child Support and Time Sharing by Parents, 33 FAM.
L.Q. 219, 221 (1999) (finding that “time sharing beyond traditional visitation is more complex than
present guidelines recognize”).
11. See G. DIANE DODSON & JOAN ENTMACHER, WOMEN’S LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, REPORT CARD
ON STATE CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES 94, 97-98 (1994) (finding that, on average, awards under 1989-
90 U.S. guidelines caused children’s living standards to decline by 26% while noncustodial parents’
improved by 34%).
12. David Betson et al., Trade-offs Implicit in Child-Support Guidelines, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 1, 19 (1992).
13. See Thoennes et al., supra note 4, at 336 (in Illinois, guidelines did not significantly increase
award levels among any income group when differences in employment status of pre and post
guideline samples were taken into account).  A significant proportion of the increase in average child
support values that researchers have noted may also be due to the imposition of token, rather than
zero-dollar, awards in cases of unemployed or female noncustodial parents.  P. BUSHARD, TIME
SERIES ASSESSMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: SUPPORT AWARDS IN SHARED CUSTODY DIVORCES
(1988) (Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University), cited in Thoennes et al., supra note 4, at 343 (15%
increase in support levels in shared custody cases after adoption of Arizona child support guidelines
was entirely due to a reduction in zero-dollar awards).
14. See 1 A.B.A. CENTER ON CHILD. AND THE LAW, EVALUATION OF CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION (1996) (support award was not within 2% above or below the guideline
value in from 10% to 45% of cases across 21 surveyed counties); David Arnaudo, Deviation from State
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reason for deviation from the guideline support values,15 and some deviations
undoubtedly represent appropriate trade-offs—support-for-property, for exam-
ple, or extraordinary visitation expenses.  But the resources and attitudes of each
parent toward the divorce also play important roles in determining child sup-
port outcomes and produce trade-offs that bear little relationship to those law-
makers intended.16  Because federal law does not mandate explanation for
variation, we have little evidence on how much is justifiable, and how much is
not.
Federal policy-makers assumed that the continuity-of-expenditure ap-
proach would significantly raise award levels, without carefully evaluating its
likely results and comparing them with solid data on past award levels.  They
assumed that clear rules would achieve consistent results, without investigating
the reasons for award variation.  And, most fundamentally, they assumed that
the continuity-of-expenditure model would achieve fair results, without devel-
oping criteria for measuring award fairness that reflected either prior legal prin-
ciples or current public values.  As a result of these various failures, the support
guidelines have failed to achieve many of the goals that motivated their enact-
ment.
The support guidelines example is instructive, but it is certainly not unique.
California replaced its equitable property distribution regime with a rule re-
quiring equal division of marital property on the assumption that equitable dis-
tribution typically produced relatively equal awards for husband and wife. The
change was expected to curb case variation without altering overall outcomes.
But researchers later determined that wives had typically received more than
half of the marital property under the old law, and they also discovered that de-
ferred distribution of the marital home in cases involving minor children de-
clined dramatically under the new one.  The change in legal standards thus had
an unexpected—and entirely unwanted—negative impact on wives and chil-
dren.17
Unintended effects may also occur when rules are replaced with discre-
tionary standards.  New York replaced a title-based property distribution rule
with an equitable distribution principle in order to benefit divorced wives, who
were thought to receive considerably less property than husbands under the old
regime.  The new law also permitted judges to award durational instead of per-
manent alimony, but increased property awards were expected to more than
offset any alimony loss occasioned by the new law.  Later research revealed,
Child Support Guidelines, in NEXT GENERATION, supra note 10, at 88-94 (summarizing state studies);
MARILYN  L. RAY, NEW YORK STATE CHILD SUPPORT STANDARDS ACT EVALUATION PROJECT REPORT
1993 54 (1994) (only 22% of sample child support orders followed guidelines).
15. A.B.A. CENTER ON CHILD. AND THE LAW,  supra note 14, at §§ 2.5-2.6.
16. See Marygold S. Melli et al., The Process of Negotiation: An Exploratory Investigation in the Con-
text of No-Fault Divorce, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1133, 1168-71 (1988) (finding that the parties’ attitudes
toward the divorce was a factor “of some significance” in determining child support outcomes.
Custodial parents who were reluctant to end the marriage and/or whose spouses were impatient to
do so obtained significantly better child support awards than the mean of the group; couples also
consistently expressed concern about legal fees and sometimes settled in order to avoid additional
expense.).
17. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 423 (citing the negative impact of
California’s adoption of an equal marital property division rule on “wives and children”).
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however, that wives had actually received, on average, slightly more net prop-
erty than had husbands under the old law, while under the new one both the
rate and permanence of alimony awards declined markedly.18  Once again, the
rule change did not achieve what its proponents had hoped for.
These various examples make it clear that the achievement of equitable
outcomes when families break up cannot be achieved either through broad
grants of discretion, or even through the substitution of rules for discretionary
standards.  Changes in the law of family dissolution will not produce equity im-
provements unless two preliminary criteria are met: legal change must reflect
public values and familial expectations, and it must also reflect a detailed un-
derstanding of current outcomes and the process by which they are produced.
III.  THE ALI PRINCIPLES
The Project on Family Dissolution has had every advantage for which a law
reform effort might hope.  Although the American Law Institute is best-known
for its Restatements of the Law, “the current disarray in family law” led the In-
stitute to opt, in this Project, for principles that would “give greater weight to
emerging legal concepts” than would a Restatement.19  Drafters of the Principles
thus were free to fashion novel legal rules.  They were also free to ignore the po-
litical pressures that may compromise the integrity of real-world legislation.
Drafters of the Principles also had the benefit of expertise; all Reporters chosen
by the Institute were highly-respected academic experts with years of experience
teaching family law and investigating the problems of family dissolution.  And
given their expertise, the drafters of the Principles immediately recognized that
“family dissolution today ordinarily is a negotiated process;” they thus sought
to “control negotiation . . . [with] appropriate presumptions and formulas [that
can] also provide benchmarks to aid courts in their review.”20  They also under-
stood that a new approach “needs a justification that can support a law operat-
ing more consistently, more reliably, and more predictably.”21  In sum, the Prin-
ciples of Family Dissolution were crafted by experts who had a sophisticated
understanding of the problems, and a free hand to devise new laws capable of
solving them.
With all of these advantages, the Project on Family Dissolution had every
prospect of developing Principles capable of producing results much fairer than
those achieved under current law.  Have the Principles met their promise?
A. Property Division
With respect to property division, the Principles rely heavily on concepts
drawn from prevailing law.  Definitions of the various forms of property subject
to division are typically much sharper than are those contained in current di-
18. See Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 674 tbl.19, 697 tbl.36, 698 tbl.37.
19. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, Foreword (Proposed Final Draft Part I, 1997) [herinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
20. Id. at xiii-xiv.
21. Id. at 8.
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vorce statutes,22 but they almost invariably reflect judicial precedents in the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions.  These definitional provisions could easily have
been contained in a Restatement; their value lies in the clarity with which widely
accepted principles are defined and the detailed examples that are provided,
rather than in the development of a novel approach.
While the equal division norm adopted by the Principles at first blush ex-
hibits novelty rather than restatement—only a handful of states have statutory
provisions establishing equal division as a presumptive outcome—a larger
number have judicial precedents that establish such a presumption or posit
equal division as an analytical starting point.23  Moreover, as the Principles note,
“the equal division rule also follows from the sharing premise that necessarily
underlies the choice of a marital rather than common-law (i.e., title-based) prop-
erty system” and “offers a rough compromise between the competing claims of
contribution and need.”24  Judges thus appear to gravitate strongly toward an
equal division norm even in states that have no statutory or case law preferring
such an outcome.25  The equal division norm thus follows the pattern of the defi-
nitional provisions and evidences the same merits.
The property distribution provisions exhibit more novelty in their attempt
to cabin the various factors now lumped together as bases for “equitable” prop-
erty allocation within black-letter rules governing deviation from the equal divi-
sion norm.  Like the California equal distribution statute, these rules should
tend to reduce the unpredictability and inconsistency that arise from current
vague, discretionary standards.  But their adoption would also pose the same
risks as did the California law: unless such a shift is based on a solid under-
standing of current outcomes, it risks unintended effects; unless its results com-
port with public values, it risks the substitution of results that are unfair for re-
sults that are unpredictable.
The experts who drafted the Principles were not, of course, unaware of the
California experience.  Nor did they imagine the possibility of drafting “reason-
able rules that unambiguously resolve every factual variation . . . [and] eliminate
all need for judicial discretion.”26  The Principles thus were designed to “[permit]
well-defined departures from an otherwise dispositive equal division presump-
tion.”27
The Principles permit deviation from an equal division of marital property
in only three situations:
The spouses are allocated net shares of the marital property and debts that are
unequal in value if, and only if,
22. Id. § 4.03.
23. Id. § 4.15 cmt. a.
24. Id. § 4.15 cmt b.
25. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 452-54, 500; Suzanne Reynolds,
The Relationship of Property Division and Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM
L. REV. 827, 854-55 (1988).
26. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 19, § 4.15 cmt. a.
27. Id.
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(a) the court concludes . . . that it is equitable to compensate a spouse for a loss
[that would otherwise result in an alimony award under] Chapter 5 . . . with
an enhanced share of the marital property; or
(b) the court concludes under 4.16 that one spouse is entitled to an enhanced
share of the marital property because the other spouse previously made an
improper disposition of some portion of it; or
(c) marital debts exceed marital assets, and it is just and equitable to assign the
excess debt unequally, because of a significant disparity in the spouses’ fi-
nancial capacity, their participation in the decision to incur the debt, or their
consumption of the goods or services that the debt was incurred to ac-
quire.28
Unequal property division is thus allowed only when property is substi-
tuted for alimony, when one spouse is guilty of financial misconduct, and when
marital debts exceed assets.  Both Chapter 5, governing alimony, and section
4.16, governing financial misconduct, contain detailed rules that the decision
maker must apply except where “substantial injustice” would result.29  For fact
patterns falling within these stated exceptions, discretion is thus cabined and
channelled, but it is not eliminated; in each category of cases, litigants and
judges can easily determine typical results, but remain free to alter those results
in atypical cases.  Like the equal division norm itself, these stated exceptions are
supported by current law and the available evidence on current outcomes.  All
equitable distribution regimes require consideration of relative need and many
specify the award of alimony as an additional factor for consideration.  Virtually
all states mandate consideration of financial misconduct, and the evidence sug-
gests that this is an important but not always predictable factor determining de-
viation from an equal outcome.30  The evidence also suggests that net debt typi-
cally is not divided equally;31 indeed, California ultimately adopted a rule like
that contained in the Principles because of the equity concerns noted in section
c.32  These property distribution provisions thus do appear to “steer a middle
course” that both captures the values contained in current law and channels dis-
cretion so as to curtail unpredictable and inconsistent outcomes.33
However, the debt exception could be substantially improved if it were ex-
panded: it is not simply net debt that tends to be disproportionately distributed
to the higher-earner spouse, but all debt.34  Because average husband earnings
continue to be higher than average wife earnings, this tendency typically bene-
fits low-wage women and often results in skewed distribution of marital net
worth in their favor.  Such cases are by no means infrequent. Reflecting the dis-
28. Id. § 4.15(2).
29. Id. §§ 4.16(5), 5.05(4).
30. See Linda D. Elrod et al., A Review of the Year in Family Law: Children’s Issues Dominate, 32
FAM. L.Q. 661, 716 tbl.5 (1999).
31. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 453 tbl.6; Good Intentions, supra
note 4, at 672 tbl.17.
32. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 2627, 2641.
33. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 464 tbl.13.
34. Id. at 453 tbl.6; see also Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 672 tbl.17.
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proportionate incidence of divorce among the young and the poor,35 as many as
half of divorcing couples have $30,000 or less in net assets to divide.  Moreover,
asset values for these property-poor couples are typically concentrated in non-
liquid goods—household furniture, the family car, and perhaps some minimal
equity in the family home—that are difficult to utilize for debt payment.36  The
frequency of these cases explains why the average share of marital property ob-
tained by women under equitable distribution regimes is typically greater than
50%37 and why that share declined when California adopted a mandatory equal
division principle.  Given that current debt distribution patterns conform with
the current law’s emphasis on need as a distributive factor and the “significant
disparity in financial capacity” rationale for disproportionate net debt distribu-
tion urged in the Principles themselves, there is every reason to expand the net
debt exception to include cases in which marital assets are minimal and largely
nonliquid.
The Principles’ treatment of separate property could also be improved.  A
significant minority of states permit the distribution of such property to the
spouse who does not hold title, and states that do not permit such distributions
typically specify the ownership of separate property as a consideration in di-
viding marital property.38  The available evidence also suggests that the exis-
tence of separate property significantly affects judicial property awards.39  This
evidence offers support for the addition of another exception to the equal divi-
sion norm for cases in which separate property represents a major portion of the
spouses’ total assets, perhaps accompanied by a provision permitting the award
of separate property to a spouse without title in appropriate circumstances.  In-
stead, the Principles require the gradual recharacterization of separate property
as marital, based on a statewide formula “that takes into account both the mari-
tal duration and the holding period of the property in question.”40  This formula
must be applied unless the separate property was received pursuant to a will or
deed of gift specifying that recharacterization should not be given effect, or the
property owner has given his or her spouse a written notice specifying that re-
characterization should not be given effect.  While the Principles permit the trial
court to preserve the property’s “separate character [when] . . . necessary to
avoid substantial injustice,”41 they do not permit the court to unequally distrib-
ute marital property or reach separate property unilaterally placed off limits
when necessary to avoid substantial injustice.  Nor do the Principles permit the
court to take account of an expected inheritance or gift upon which the spouses
have relied, but which has not yet been received.  The result is that in many
cases where the nonpropertied spouse has justifiably and detrimentally relied
on the expectation of sharing in the propertied spouse’s separate assets, the
35. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 439 (citing sources).
36. See Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 660 tbl.9, 666.
37. Id. at 675 tbl.20.
38. See Elrod et al., supra note 30, at 717 chart 5.
39. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 463-64 tbl.13.
40. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 19, § 4.18(2)(a).
41. Id.
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court’s hands are tied.42  Given that the Principles’ separate property provisions
are based in part on the premise that parties to a long marriage often rely on the
expectation that one or the other’s separate assets will be available to them
jointly during retirement or in an emergency43—a premise that also seems evi-
dent in the cases decided under current law—the separate property provisions
seem too narrow to effect an improvement in outcomes.  Couples with signifi-
cant separate property represent a tiny fraction of the divorce population,44 but
for that group more flexibility is necessary in order to meet fairness goals.
Who would benefit from adoption of the Principles’ property distribution
rules?  All couples who avoid litigation because of the greater precision of the
Principles would benefit from reduced legal fees.  Spouses who would  have set-
tled for a disproportionately low property award under current law would also
benefit.  This could be a sizeable group because the little evidence that is avail-
able suggests that, while judges strongly gravitate toward an equal division
norm, litigants do not.45  Disproportionate awards and settlements appear to be
particularly common when there is considerable disparity in the value of the as-
sets to which each spouse holds title and when the value of net assets is either
very high or very low.46  Reflecting the much greater likelihood that husbands
will own valuable marital assets, these tendencies typically benefit husbands in
wealthy families even though, as we have seen, they typically benefit needy
wives in poor ones.  As presently structured, the Principles thus would primarily
benefit wives in wealthy marriages; the Principles would largely preclude
awards favoring title-holder husbands in such cases and the value of the assets
at stake would make litigation threats worthwhile and credible.  This shift
would represent an improvement in the fairness of divorce outcomes because
title is an illegitimate divisional factor even under current equitable distribution
standards.
But it is important to keep in mind that the gains wives in wealthy mar-
riages should obtain under the Principles would likely be offset by losses suf-
fered by their counterparts in poor families; without expansion of the existing
net debt exception, poor wives should shoulder a higher percentage of debt than
is typical under existing standards and thus receive lower percentages of net
property than are now typical.  Because litigation is much less likely in these
cases, it is possible that this shift in outcomes would not occur.  But it is a real
risk, a risk made more notable both by the higher incidence of divorce among
the poor and the fact that, under current law, divorce imposes the greatest eco-
42. One obvious example is the spouse (Husband, for example) who expects to rely on Wife’s
expected inheritance during retirement and thus forgoes investment in a pension; after twenty years
of marriage, Wife receives the inheritance and promptly hands Husband a disqualifying notice or
files for divorce.  Under the Principles, the Court would be required to divide the marital property
equally, and could not divide Wife’s inheritance.  For cases involving similar facts, see In re Marriage
of Bekooy, 846 P.2d 1183 (Or. Ct. App. 1993); Zeh v. Zeh, 618 N.E.2d 1376 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)
(both cited in the Principles).
43. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 19, § 4.18 cmt. a.
44. See Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 660-62.
45. Id. at 686.
46. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 459-60, 464-66; see also Garrison,
Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 696 tbl.35.
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nomic hardship on low-income women and the children in their custody.  Be-
cause smaller debt awards for this group are typically justified both by the need
criteria of current law and the Principles’ proposed “significant disparity in fi-
nancial capacity” criterion for disparate net debt distribution, the diminished
prospects of wives in poor families would appear to represent an equity loss.
As currently drafted, the ALI property distribution principles thus likely
would produce an equity gain for one group, offset by an equity loss for an-
other.  In terms of dollar value, the equity gains of wives in wealthy marriages
would probably offset the losses of the wives in poor ones.  But because of the
disproportionate numbers of poor couples among the divorce population, it is
likely that more women would suffer losses than would experience gains.  And
those losses would be experienced  by those who can least afford it, and who al-
ready experience the greatest financial hardship following family dissolution.
B. Alimony and Child Support
Because of the relative infrequency of valuable assets among the divorce
population, alimony and child support entitlements are far more important to
the typical divorcing couple than is property distribution law.  As we have seen,
today’s child support law tends to achieve results that improve the living stan-
dard of the support obligor while reducing that of his children.  This living
standard loss is not generally offset by alimony awards.  Nationally, alimony is
awarded in approximately 15% of divorce cases; its duration is typically very
limited.47
Theoretically, revised alimony and child support principles could alter
these patterns in a way that would more than offset the equity losses that the
property distribution principles would likely produce. But it is important to note
that current patterns are long-standing patterns. The discretionary standards
which current numerical support guidelines replaced did not produce markedly
higher support values or a lower living-standard gap.48  Nor did traditional ali-
mony law, which emphasized fault over need, produce a higher incidence of
alimony awards.49  The patterns we see today have endured for generations and
have survived significant changes in legal standards. Altering these patterns
thus poses a considerable challenge.
1. Alimony
With respect to alimony, the Principles take up this challenge by reconceiv-
ing spousal support as a compensatory entitlement instead of a need-based rem-
edy.  This is a significant shift, indeed the most notable divorce law innovation
contained in the Principles.  So transformed, alimony would represent a “com-
pensatory award . . . for financial losses incur[red] . . . when the family is di-
vided into separate economic units.”50  More traditionally, the Principles do not
47. See HARRY D. KRAUSE ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 793 (4th ed.
1998); see also Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 698.
48. See Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 633 nn.42-43 (citing studies).
49. It did, however, produce a much higher incidence of permanent awards.  Id. at 634 n.44
(citing studies).
50. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 19, § 5.03(1).
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mandate compensation for every such loss.  Alimony would be available only
for:
(a) in a marriage of long duration, the loss of living standard experienced at
dissolution by the spouse who has less wealth or earning capacity;
(b-c)an earning capacity loss . . . arising from one spouse’s disproportionate
share, during marriage, of the care of the marital children or of the children
of either spouse . . . or arising from the care provided by one spouse to a
sick, elderly or disabled third party in fulfillment of a moral obligation of
the other spouse or of both spouses jointly;
(d) the loss either spouse incurs when the marriage is dissolved before that
spouse realizes a fair return from his or her investment in the other spouse’s
earning capacity; and
(e) an unfairly disproportionate disparity between the spouses in their respec-
tive abilities to recover their pre-marital living standard after the dissolu-
tion of a short marriage.51
Like the proposed property distribution rules, these various bases for an
alimony claim all have a source in current law.  Virtually all state alimony stat-
utes recognize marital duration, need, and child care responsibilities as impor-
tant factors in alimony determination; although factor (d) is less traditional,
many now recognize unreimbursed contribution as well.  Judges and litigants
also appear to place great weight on these factors; indeed, the evidence suggests
that income disparity and marital duration are among the most important ali-
mony determinants.52
In contrast to current law, the Principles would establish, for each type of
alimony claim, percentage-based presumptions governing both the duration and
value of the alimony award.  These presumptions would unquestionably curb
both the variation and reliance on private values currently evident in judicial
alimony decisions.53  In many cases, the alimony entitlements established by the
Principles should also be sufficiently valuable to produce credible litigation
threats.  Given this fact, the new rules would also stand a good chance of re-
ducing the variability of alimony outcomes in settled cases.  Moreover, while the
concept of an alimony entitlement is novel, the specified bases for alimony all
have a foundation in current legal standards.54
51. Id. § 5.03.
52. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 483-85.
53. One example of such intrusion is the class bias often evident in alimony outcomes.  In my
survey of alimony decision making, for example, the husband’s job status was a more powerful pre-
dictive variable than was his income both for judicially decided and settled cases. Id. at 485-86.
54. One relatively unusual case in which the Principles may not be consistent with public values
is that of the spouse who is guilty of a serious marital offense.  Although the Principles preclude all
consideration of fault, in more than half of the states fault remains a relevant factor in alimony deci-
sion making.  See Elrod et al., supra note 30, at 712 chart 1.  The impact of marital fault on alimony
decision making appears to be slight but significant.  See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, su-
pra note 4, at 482-83.  Nor is it obvious that public values would give typical alimony treatment to
the alimony claim of a wife who had hired a contract killer to murder her husband, Valenza v. Va-
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However, the Reporter’s decision not to offer appropriate percentages
makes it impossible to predict whether the outcomes produced would ulti-
mately be fairer than those achieved under current law.55  For example, both the
award and value of alimony for living standard loss in a long marriage is de-
termined by applying a “specified percentage to the difference between the in-
comes the spouses are expected to have after dissolution,” while the duration of
such an award is to be fixed by “the length of the marriage multipled by a factor
specified in the rule . . . .”56  But different percentages will produce different re-
sults.  Today’s numerical child support guidelines again offer an instructive ex-
ample.  While the majority of the states adopted the same “income shares” sup-
port model, they have implemented it utilizing different percentages and
income definitions.  The result is highly disparate outcomes; for example, chil-
dren entitled to $1,054 per month in Nebraska, one midwest income-shares
state, would obtain only $660 in Oklahoma, another such state.57
The alimony provisions would be vastly improved if appropriate percent-
ages were offered.  The Uniform Probate Code provisions on the spousal right of
election—which also utilize percentages based on marital duration—take this
approach.58  So, indeed, do the child support provisions of the ALI draft.  There
is no obvious reason why the alimony rules should not do so as well. Without
such detail, it is not altogether clear who would win under the Principles, and
who would lose.
While the Principles lack of specificity makes it difficult to precisely deter-
mine who would benefit, under any reasonable implementational percentages,
the alimony award rate should go up quite dramatically: while the most typical
alimony recipient is a long-married, low-income wife married to a high-income
husband, alimony is not awarded in many cases exhibiting all of these charac-
teristics.59  Thus the “living standard disparity” provision thus should increase
the frequency of alimony awards among long-married women.  This increase
would represent an equity gain as current law posits this type of case as the
“ideal” alimony situation, and judges rarely deny alimony in such circum-
stances.60  Mothers in short marriages should, under the Principles, experience an
lenza, N.Y.L.J. 1/6/90, at 16, col. 1, or to that of a wife who had both borne children that were the
product of a nonmarital relationship and lied to her husband about his paternity, Doe v. Doe, 712
A.2d 1323 (1998).  Under current discretionary standards, courts need not rely explicitly on fault
grounds to deny alimony in such a case.  But under the Principles, they would be required to award
alimony if durational and other requirements had been met.  The Principles similarly eschew all con-
sideration of fault in property division, giving rise to similar issues of fairness.  A larger group of
states preclude consideration of fault in property division, however.  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra
note 19, at 50-51.
55. Examples contained in the comments to the alimony provisions do employ a maximum per-
centage of either .4 or .5, but the Principles nonetheless “contain no recommendation as to the proper
maximum or minimum value of the durational factor.”  Id. § 5.05 cmt. g.
56. Id. §§ 5.05(3), 5.07(1)(b).
57. See Laura W. Morgan & Mark C. Lino, A Comparison of Child Support Awards Calculated Under
States’ Child Support Guidelines with Expenditures on Children Calculated by the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture, 33 FAM. L.Q. 191, 192 n.5, 209 tbl.4 (1999).
58. UNIF. PROBATE CODE  § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 101 (1998).
59. See Garrison, Good Intentions, supra note 4, at 707-08 tbl.46.
60. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 468-69.
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even much more dramatic improvement in their alimony prospects.  The
“earning capacity loss” provision is applicable to women married for brief as
well as long periods of time, and does not require a showing of actual earning
capacity loss; such loss is instead conclusively presumed from a showing of dis-
proportionate child care responsibilities.61  Because disproportionate child care
responsibilities are typical but current law rarely produces alimony awards
when the marriage was brief, the “earning capacity loss” provision should logi-
cally create large numbers of new alimony entitlements.  Indeed, given prevail-
ing child care and income patterns, the Principles should ensure that alimony be-
comes the norm among divorcing couples with children, even if the marriage is
short.
Without information on the “child care durational factor” that would gov-
ern the value of “earning capacity loss” alimony awards, it is impossible to de-
termine the value of these new entitlements.  But there is reason for considerable
skepticism about the likelihood that any real legislature would create such enti-
tlements if coupled with robust percentages; legislatures have repeatedly cur-
tailed alimony prospects over the past few decades but have rarely expanded
them.  Moreover, in my survey of alimony decision making by judges, the ali-
mony award rate was fourteen percentage points higher at the beginning of the
survey period than it was at the end; indeed, the year of decision was a signifi-
cant negative predictor of an alimony award.62  Nor is there evidence of popular
support for a major expansion of alimony entitlements; surveys conducted dur-
ing the decade between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s how a majority of Ameri-
can women reporting that the divorced woman who can earn a “reasonable in-
come” should not receive alimony under any circumstances.63  But theoretically
the ALI Principles would vastly increase the number of alimony awards among
low-income parents with the custody of minor children, entitlements that might
61. Under the Principles, a parent whose job and work hours did not shift after assuming dis-
proportionate child care responsibilities is entitled to alimony as long as her earning capacity at dis-
solution is “substantially less than that of the other spouse.”  See ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 19,
§ 5.06(2)(c) cmt.d.
62. See Garrison, Discretionary Decision Making, supra note 4, at 468-70 tbl.14.
63. See Virginia Slims American Women’s Poll 1985 Question ID: USROPER 85VASL Q37 (re-
porting that 54% of 3000 adult American women responded “no” and 20% “it depends” when asked:
“If a divorced woman has or can earn a reasonable income, do you think she shoul receive alimony
from her ex-husband or not?”); Virginia Slims American Women’s Poll 1979 Question ID: USROPER
79VASL Q34 (reporting that 59% of 2960 adult women responded “no” and 19% responded “it de-
pends” when asked: “If a divorced woman has or can earn a reasonable income, do you think she
should receive alimony from her ex-husband or not?”); Virginia Slims American Women’s Poll 1974
Question ID: USROPER 74VASL Q40A (reporting that 67% of 2922 adult women responded “no”
and 10% responded “it depends” when asked: “If a divorced woman has or can earn a reasonable
income, do you think she should receive alimony from her ex-husband or not?”); American Women
Today and Tomorrow 1975 Survey Question ID: USMOR 75WOMN R50 (reporting that 70% of 1522
adult American women responded “no” and 17% responded “it depends” when asked: “If a couple
are divorced, do you think the woman should get alimony even if she is able to support herself?”).
It is intriguing that the surveys suggest somewhat more support for alimony during the
1980s than during the 1970s; continuation of this trend would suggest more public enthusiasm for
alimony than I have posited.  But the fact that there are no recent surveys also suggest that pollsters
do not believe that alimony is a topic timely enough to continue asking questions about it.
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more than offset the equity losses this needy group would experience under the
property division provisions of the Principles.
2. Child Support
While the ALI child support provisions improve on the alimony rules in
their specificity, they lack the conceptual clarity of the alimony rules.  This fail-
ing flows from the Reporter’s decision to tinker with the continuity-of-
expenditure model rather than replace it with one that is more consistent with
traditional support standards and public values.  Although the “enhanced”
model outlined in the Principles produces outcomes that represent a consider-
able improvement over those achieved under most existing guidelines, it re-
mains difficult to apply in common cases like joint custody or a change in family
composition.64  Moreover, because the tinkering introduces elements foreign to
the continuity-of-expenditure model itself, the net result, in the words of the Re-
porter herself, is a “basic measure of child support [that is] . . . not . . . suscepti-
ble to easy definition.”65
The decision to retain the continuity-of-expenditure model is puzzling.
The ALI report makes it clear that an approach focused on achieving equal liv-
ing standards for noncustodial parents and their children is the one “most likely
to protect children from poverty and to enable them to enjoy a relatively high
standard of living.”66  It stresses that “in view of the importance of the child’s
claims and the availability of an equal living standards measure that would fully
satisfy those claims, the choice of a more modest measure [such as the one the
Principles propose] requires persuasive justification.”67
Unfortunately, the report devotes little space to explaining what factors
were found persuasive.  In the few paragraphs allocated to the alternative equal
living-standards model, it notes that:
The . . . model, which would generally respond more amply to the interests of
children, presents two difficulties.  First, it gives no weight to the primacy of the
earner’s claims to his own earnings. . . . Whether or not this treatment is ethi-
cally sound, it would seem culturally unacceptable and hence politically unre-
alizable.  If this were the only objection to the equal living standards model, it
might be appropriate to resist the objection. . . .  Yet the equal living standards
model suffers from a more serious defect: It would create substantial work dis-
incentive for the residential parent. . . An equal living standards, as compared to
a marginal expenditure model, would reduce total family income by about 11%.
64. The ALI enhanced model deviates from a typical continuity-of-expenditure guideline in two
important respects: it provides a self-support reserve for the child’s household and it includes a
supplement explicitly designed to enhance the likelihood that the supported child will enjoy a both a
“minimum decent standard of living” and a living standard “not grossly inferior” to that of the non-
residential parent.  The supplement is expressed as an income percentage and added to the base,
marginal expenditure percentage.  As the income of the residential parent rises, the supplement de-
clines.  See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part II, 1998).
65. ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
3.04 cmt. d(iii) (Preliminary Draft No. 7, 1997).
66. CHILD SUPPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 64, § 3.04 cmt. d(i).
67. Id. § 3.03 cmt. i.
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Almost all of the reduction would be attributable to reduced residential parent
labor force participation.”68
While rejection of an equal outcomes model thus appears to rest primarily
on concerns about its impact on work incentives, and secondarily on the as-
sumption that equal living standards for parents and children is “culturally un-
acceptable,” neither of these objections make much sense in light of the ALI’s
own recommendations.  First, the drafters of the ALI recommendations clearly
understood that any and all guidelines can be modified to take account of work
disincentives. In fact, an important feature of the enhanced model is an “im-
puted” income provision designed to do just that.69  An equal outcomes ap-
proach—or any support model—can be similarly modified.  Second, if equal
living standards for parents and their children are “culturally unacceptable,” it
would appear that the enhanced model proposed by the ALI should also be un-
acceptable.  As I have demonstrated in detail elsewhere, the enhanced model
produces remarkably similar awards to those that would be obtained under an
equal outcomes model in many cases.70  Third, even assuming that a model re-
quiring equal living standards does not comport with public values, it is still
possible to focus on living standard—which everyone can understand and
which is the result claimants and obligors care about—as a guiding principle.
This is the approach taken in the alimony provisions, which for long-married
spouses require compensation for the reduced standard of living that will result
from divorce, without requiring equalization.71  Indeed, reflecting the fact that
the continuity-of-expenditure model is extremely difficult to apply in such
situations, the Principles do require a comparative evaluation of living standards
in joint and split custody cases.72  It is not obvious why such an evaluation is ap-
propriate in these cases and not in others.
The general child support provisions are explicitly aimed at “the dual ob-
jectives of [income] adequacy and avoidance of gross disproportion [of living
standards].”73  But it is far from obvious why a long-married spouse should be
entitled to compensation for any significant living standard loss when a child of
the relationship, who played no role in its dissolution, should be entitled only to
the “avoidance of gross disproportion.”74
68. Id. § 3.05A cmt. j.  The 11% figure is derived from the calculations of Betson et al., supra note
12.
69. CHILD SUPPORT RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 63, § 3.06B.
70. Marsha Garrison, Child Support Policy: Guidelines and Goals, 33 FAM. L. Q. 157 (1999)
71. The Principles suggest alimony that, at its maximum value, would equal 40% of the differ-
ence in the post-divorce spousal incomes.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 173 (Council Draft No. 6, 1999).
72. Id. § 3.15 .
73. Id. § 3.05B cmt c.
74. Nor is it obvious why the interests of higher-income obligors should have greater weight
than those of their low and moderate-income counterparts.  Of course, at very high-income levels,
expenditures are less likely to benefit children than they will at lower socioeconomic levels.  But this
concern is not likely to arise within the $24,000 to $36,000 net annual income range at which the
model begins to offer obligors a break. The result is that the enhanced model comparatively disad-
vantages lower income obligors.
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The disparity in compensation standards for former wives and children is
not supported by traditional divorce law, which focused on (although it failed to
achieve) maintenance of the intact family’s standard of living in both cases.  Nor
is it supported by recent legal trends.  During the same period in which both the
states and federal government were enacting measures aimed at raising the fre-
quency and value of child support awards, legislatures were curtailing wives’
alimony prospects with the durational award, designed to limit alimony pay-
ments to a fixed period of economic “rehabilitation.”75  Many observers view the
recent divergence in alimony and child support law as an important reason for
policymakers’ preference for the continuity-of-expenditure model over one
based on equal living standards, noting suspicions that “some policy makers. . .
find the possibility of what they term ‘hidden alimony’ onerous enough to jus-
tify abandoning efforts to protect fully the child’s standard of living;” indeed,
this view is cited as a prime reason for the ALI claim that equal living standards
for parents and their children would be “culturally unacceptable.”76  But if “hid-
den alimony” is the root of opposition to a living-standard based approach to
child support, it seems particularly ironic that an important category of alimony
cases would be governed by this very approach.
It is possible that rejection of a living-standard approach to child support is
disingenuous: the extraordinarily complex ALI formula—comprised of a base
award, a “minimum decent living standard” supplement, a reduction factor, in-
come exemptions, and special hardship deductions—produces results close to
those of the equal living standards model in cases of relatively equal parental
incomes and in cases of disproportionate income where total income is low or
moderate.  Perhaps the Reporter has concluded that murky principles which
achieve relatively equal living standards “by accident” are politically more ac-
ceptable than clear principles that do so on purpose.  But the same happy acci-
dent is not achieved in higher-income (i.e., $24,000 or more net annual income)
families, and the ALI standards offer no clear metric by which to test the fairness
of such a pattern.
Despite its conceptual murkiness, however, it is important to keep in mind
that the enhanced support model urged by the ALI would produce awards that
are higher than those achieved under current guidelines and which would at
least reduce living-standard disparity between noncustodial parents and their
children.  Moreover, it would appear that the largest benefits would be obtained
by low-income children, the group for whom divorce poses the greatest risks
and whose basic needs often cannot be met at current support levels.  Because
minor children are invariably the blameless victims of divorce and because
higher support awards appear to be supported both by public opinion and Con-
gressional policy, this shift represents a considerable equity improvement over
the outcomes suggested by current support guidelines.
75. See, e.g., Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Alimony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Ali-
mony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573 (1988); Sally F. Goldfarb, Marital Partnership and the Case for Permanent Ali-
mony, 27 J. FAM. L. 351 (1988-89); Ann Laquer Estin, Maintenance, Alimony, and the Rehabilitation of
Family Care, 71 N.C. L. REV. 721 (1993).
76. See Garrison, Autonomy or Community, supra note 9, at 70 n.147 (citing sources).
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The proposed guidelines are not more precise than current guidelines,
however. Nor do they offer new mechanisms to curb award variation.  Existing
levels of award noncomformance thus would likely continue unabated.
In sum, the Principles’ alimony and child support provisions both promise
equity gains.  These gains are particularly significant because they would tend
to improve the economic circumstances of those who are most disadvantaged by
family dissolution under current law.  But the proposed Principles also fail in
important, though opposite, respects.  The alimony provisions provide a clear
concept without adequate implementational detail, while the child support rules
provide detail without a clear guiding principle.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The Principles offer what is almost certainly an improvement over current
law.  They create entitlements that are more certain and, at least with respect to
property and alimony, conceptually much clearer than the broad equitable stan-
dards that currently govern these awards. In many, if not all, case categories the
Principles should enhance the equity of divorce outcomes.
While these are notable achievements, the Principles could—and should—
achieve more. We expect flaws in enactments drafted hurriedly in backrooms by
legislators who are dependent on outside experts to make up for their own igno-
rance of the relevant field.  But from Principles crafted by experts over more than
a decade, we expect more.
